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More than three decades ago, I reported for my training as a U.S. Army military
intelligence officer. I really had no idea what to expect. Having enlisted in the Army
six months earlier and successfully completed Initial Entry Training and Officer
Candidate School, I knew very little about the focus of the training I was about to
begin. “Intelligence” brought to my mind clandestine activities; but I would soon
learn that such activities were a relatively insignificant focus of my training. Instead,
I would learn everything possible about the enemy our nation considered its most
likely and dangerous threat at that time—the Soviet military.
I quickly learned that “intelligence” is the essential predicate to the efficient and
effective use of combat power to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objec-
tives.1 My function as a staff intelligence officer would be to contribute to the mission
planning and execution process by providing that predicate. But the broader lesson
I learned then, and during my several years performing that function for Army units
in Panama, was that knowing how the enemy operates is what enables exploitation
of enemy vulnerabilities and protection against enemy capabilities.
The world has obviously changed substantially since 1984 (although the prospect
of a “new” Cold War with Russia is an increasingly significant national security
concern).2 Transnational terrorism is now considered a primary national security
* Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law
Houston; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Prior to
joining the faculty at South Texas, Professor Corn served in a variety of military assignments,
including as the Army’s Senior Law of War Advisor, Supervisory Defense Counsel for the
Western United States, Chief of International Law for U.S. Army Europe, and as a Tactical
Intelligence Officer in Panama.
1 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE PUBLICATION
2-0, INTELLIGENCE (2012).
2 See Evan Osnos et al., Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War: What Lay Behind Russia’s
Interference in the 2016 Election—And What Lies Ahead?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2017),
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threat.3 In ways too numerous to catalogue in this Article, that threat is substantially
different than the former prospect of a full-scale war with the Soviet Union.4 None-
theless, in response to transnational terrorism, the basic function of intelligence is
really no different than it was in response to the Soviet threat: identify enemy strengths
and weaknesses, predict enemy course of action, and maximize the effectiveness of
our response by ensuring it is directed towards the right objectives.
But the differences in this threat certainly make the process of gathering vital
intelligence different. Unlike the conventional military threat represented by the Soviet
Union, transnational terrorist groups are remarkably adept at operating in the shadows
and cloaking intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities to frustrate U.S. counterter-
rorism efforts.5 Indeed, the very nature of this struggle is defined by asymmetry—
asymmetry in the capabilities of the foes, asymmetry in the nature of the targets each
seeks to strike, asymmetry in respect for the rule of law in relation to operations, and
asymmetry in the very definition of success.6 These asymmetries inevitably impact
the means and methods of effective counterterrorism operations.
For the transnational terrorist enemy, rule of law is an anathema.7 Indeed, law is
a tool they seek to exploit to gain tactical and strategic advantage.8 These enemies
know law will inevitably impose constraints on their more advanced opponents, and
that these constraints provide maneuver space that can be exploited to achieve their
objectives. In contrast, the United States views law not as a constraint, but as an
essential foundation for ensuring the legitimacy of our counterterrorism operations.9
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/trump-putin-and-the-new-cold-war
[https://perma.cc/JB3S-TNTX]. But see Michael Cohen, Peace in the Post–Cold War World:
The World Is a Much Safer Place Than It Was 20 Years Ago—Here’s Why, How It Happened,
and What It Means for Our Future, ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com
/international/archive/2011/12/peace-in-the-post-cold-war-world/249863 [https://perma.cc
/C3UL-6DEG].
3 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 1 (2006).
4 Compare NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, NSC 68: UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (1950), with DANIEL R. COATS, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2017) (statement from the Director of National Intel-
ligence to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence).
5 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 7–8 (2003).
6 See generally Ayaz Ahmed Kahn, Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare: International
and Regional Implications, DEFENCE J. (Pak.), http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/february
/terrorism.htm [https://perma.cc/L8M9-6EUQ] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017); Asymmetric Warfare,
RAND CORP., http://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html [https://perma.cc/UG3R
-5ZSH] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
7 See, e.g., How Do You Define Terrorism?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2001), http://abcnews
.go.com/US/story?id=92340 [https://perma.cc/G88S-2FJJ].
8 See generally, e.g., Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and
Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445 (2002).
9 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19–20 (2015), http://nssarchive
.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4KF-Y3LA]; JOINT CHIEFS OF
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While U.S. legal interpretations may not always be viewed as ideal or valid by do-
mestic and international audiences, no one can seriously question U.S. commitment to
acting within established legal frameworks when executing national security policies.10
Nonetheless, the inevitable limitations on national power that result from these legal
frameworks can at times be exploited by the terrorist enemy.11
The risks associated with the threat of transnational terrorism and the measures
employed to deter, disrupt, and possibly defeat such threats are also complicated by
the undeniable fact that this “enemy” straddles the line between law enforcement and
armed conflict. Indeed, one of the most complex aspects of the U.S. response to trans-
national terrorism has been identifying if and when the use of military power is
justified pursuant to the law of armed conflict.12 Unlike past conflicts, however,
criminal law tools are not a minor complement to war powers.13 Instead, in this
ongoing struggle, both criminal law and military powers are used extensively to
achieve national security objectives.14
The invocation of war powers has not, however, been uncontroversial. Both in-
ternational lawyers and civil libertarians have frequently criticized what they assert is
the overzealous use of war powers in response to this threat.15 In this sense, this “con-
flict” is truly unique, as it involves a threat that often may be effectively addressed
through the use of criminal law powers instead of war powers. Indeed, one truly
STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS I-5 (2017), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine
/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3QX-9YA5] (“National strategic direction is gov-
erned by the Constitution, federal law, USG policy, internationally recognized law, and the
national interest as represented by national security policy.”).
10 See Geoffrey S. Corn & Tanweer Kaleemullah, The Military Response to Criminal
Violent Extremist Groups: Aligning Use of Force Presumptions with Threat Reality, 47 ISR.
L. REV. 253, 281–83 (2014).
11 See Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public Safety and
Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of James
Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney
General); David P. Fidler, Despite Progress, Combating Terrorist Exploitation of Cyber-
space Faces Mounting Problems, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://cfr.org
/blog/despite-progress-combating-terrorist-exploitation-cyberspace-faces-mounting-problems
[https://perma.cc/K6YM-FF8A].
12 See KENNETH WATKIN, FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES: CONTROLLING THE USE
OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT (2016); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5–7 (2002); George Terwilliger
et al., The War on Terrorism: Law Enforcement or National Security?, FEDERALIST SOC’Y
(Feb. 15, 2005), http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/detail/the-war-on-terrorism-law-enforce
ment-or-national-security [https://perma.cc/T8NG-QLHS].
13 See David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 967–72 (2009).
14 See id.
15 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT’L
SEC. L. & POL’Y 343, 368 (2010).
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unique aspect of the response to transnational terrorism is that military power may
be more of a complement to criminal law powers.
But while this may be unique in the history of American wars, it is arguably
illustrative of an emerging “threat response” paradigm—one in which peacetime
legal response mechanisms are viewed as the norm, with periodic necessity and legal
justification to expand national response authorities to those provided by military
force operating pursuant to the law of armed conflict. As one distinguished author
explains, this may be the true nature of “fighting at the legal boundaries.”16
There are inherent dangers in this paradigm, both to security and liberty. From
a security perspective, viewing the tools of armed conflict as the exception rather than
the norm may offer terrorist enemies opportunities that might not otherwise exist.
In this sense, the government and the people must assume a certain degree of addi-
tional risk that could be averted by treating every aspect of transnational terrorism as
a wartime issue. However, from a liberty perspective, a wartime approach poses a
substantial risk that government power will be exercised in a manner inconsistent
with our core values. This is no exaggerated risk. The motivation of our very own
national experiment came in part from revulsion to the overzealous use of military
power by the Crown and the erosion of individual liberties it produced.17 That revul-
sion made its way into the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and, following the experi-
ence of Reconstruction after the Civil War, into federal legislation that strictly limited
the permissible use of federal military forces to respond to domestic threats.18
Surveillance is one area where the balance between wartime and peacetime
threat response authority is particularly important. For example, consider a display
from a recent congressional hearing. In this example, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Admiral commanding the National Security
Agency (NSA) appeared together in a congressional hearing focused on surveillance
of the Trump campaign and Russian efforts to influence the 2016 national election.19
The mere visual impression left by this provides a reminder of the growing intersec-
tion of civilian and military intelligence and surveillance capabilities. Furthermore,
the nature of cyber threats has also blurred the line between wartime and peacetime
powers, a blurring that is exacerbated by the difficulty of even characterizing the
16 See WATKIN, supra note 12, at 3–30.
17 American Revolution History, HISTORY (2009), https://www.history.com/topics/amer
ican-revolution/american-revolution-history [https://perma.cc/PX9N-NTZE].
18 See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012); see also GEOFFREY CORN ET AL.,
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 462–65 (2015) (providing a more nu-
anced discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act and the general prohibition on the use of federal
military intervention in domestic affairs).
19 See Excerpts from the House Intelligence Committee Hearing on Russia, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/us/politics/james-comey-mike-rogers
-transcript-excerpts.html?_r=0.
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very nature of cyber operations.20 Because “cyber” involves aspects of traditional
criminal threats, espionage, and wartime threats,21 it may be logical that U.S. cyber
“operations” involve close coordination between civilian and military authorities.
But this also indicates how tempting it will be in the future to characterize issues as
wartime in nature, in order to maximize the military role in response measures.
All of these considerations point to a common imperative—ensuring that peacetime
law enforcement response capabilities are not significantly hobbled by the intersec-
tion of emerging privacy, technology, and restrictive Fourth Amendment interpreta-
tions. As I have argued in other publications, I believe the Fourth Amendment actually
supports government policies that ensure lawful access to “dark” spaces.22 Accord-
ingly, I have proposed the imposition of a “split key” creation and retention obligation
imposed on entities that market end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for personal elec-
tronic devices such as smart phones.23 While I recognize that such a requirement will
increase the risk of unauthorized government access to private data, and possibly the
risk of private security breaches, that risk is inherent in almost all other zones of
individual privacy.
In this Article, I argue that the interest in ensuring a fair balance between privacy
and government access to data is supported by another consideration, one that I have
hinted to above—the risk of incentivizing the expansion of wartime-based authorities
to access such data. To this end, I will first summarize my previously asserted Fourth
20 “Encryption” is the process of encoding data so that only those with authorized access
can read it. James Titcomb, What Is Encryption, How Does It Work and What Apps Use It?,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Mar. 29, 2017, 11:37 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/en
cryption-should-using/ [https://perma.cc/TVY7-6AMX]. A basic tenet of cryptography is that
the security of the cryptosystem should rely upon the secrecy of the key and not the secrecy
of the system’s encryption algorithm. SUSAN LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY?: THE
RISKS POSED BY NEW WIRETAPPING TECHNOLOGIES 43 (2010). Unlike earlier forms of encryp-
tion provided by telecommunications companies, see generally Andrew W. Yung, Regulating
the Genie: Effective Wiretaps in the Information Age, 101 DICK. L. REV. 95 (1996), modern
encryption methods are solely controlled by the user, see J. Riley Atwood, Comment, The
Encryption Problem: Why the Courts and Technology Are Creating a Mess for Law Enforce-
ment, 34 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 407, 407, 410–12 (2015). This has made it increasingly
difficult for the government to obtain access to digital communications and information—
even where pursuant to lawful authorization. See generally Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal,
Decrypting Our Security: A Bipartisan Argument for a Rational Solution to the Encryption
Challenge, 24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 273 (2016). This growing difficulty, and perhaps eventual
impossibility, is often described as “going dark.” Christopher Babiarz, Encryption Friction,
10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 351, 354 (2017).
21 See Jessica R. Gross, Note, Hack and Be Hacked: A Framework for the United States
to Respond to Non-State Actors in Cyberspace, 46 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 109, 122–37 (2016).
22 See Geoffrey S. Corn & Dru Brenner-Beck, “Going Dark”: Encryption, Privacy, Liberty,
and Security in the “Golden Age of Surveillance,” in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SUR-
VEILLANCE LAW 330 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017).
23 Id. at 361–62.
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Amendment balance argument. I will then discuss the nature of transnational terrorist
threats and how their reliance on asymmetric tactics creates an imperative for avoiding
legal interpretations that provide the dark spaces they seek to exploit, especially in
relation to communications. This will lead to a discussion of the increasingly “indi-
vidualized” nature of armed conflicts against transnational terrorist enemies such as
al Qaeda and ISIS, and how this individualization has and will continue to influence
the perceived imperative of access to individual communications and data. The
Article will then argue that the current boundaries between wartime and peacetime
government power are built on a tenuous legal foundation. As a result, excessive
restrictions on law enforcement response authority to asymmetric threats could very
easily lead to an expansion of the “wartime” track to reach information perceived
as critical for counterterrorism operations.
This last consideration leads to the culmination of my argument—individual
liberty will be best protected by incentivizing the maximization of the “law enforce-
ment” counterterrorism track, and minimizing the incentives to resort to the “wartime”
track. In specific relation to access to data, “big” or “small,” ensuring a fair balance
between individual privacy and lawful government access to data will incentivize the
use of the individual cause and warrant process for authorizing such access. As the
Supreme Court noted in its seminal surveillance opinion, United States v. United
States District Court (Keith),24 imposition of the neutral magistrate between the
zealous government agent and the individual is a vital safeguard against arbitrary
government power.25 But as will be explained below, that same case opened the door
to expansive assertions of wartime surveillance power that would nullify the protec-
tive benefit of that authorization process.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS AND THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS
Assessing the legality of government efforts to surveil “dark” spaces, whether
motivated by law enforcement or counterterrorism interests, must begin with the Fourth
Amendment. In one of my previously published articles, which has since evolved
into a chapter for the book, The Cambridge Handbook of Surveillance Law, I argue
that the Fourth Amendment imposes no barrier to enactment of laws requiring
feasible government access to encrypted data.26 The focus of that chapter evolved from
24 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
25 Id. at 315–22 (“Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a ‘neutral and
detached magistrate.’” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) and
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967)); id. at 316–17 (“Fourth Amendment freedoms
cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely
within the discretion of the Executive Branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate
the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and
responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute.” (citing Katz, 389 U.S.
at 359–60 (Douglas, J., concurring))).
26 See Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 22, at 345.
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the substantial public debates surrounding the San Bernardino iPhone “incident.”27
Many critics of the government, including the aforementioned chapter’s co-author,
questioned the wisdom and legality of government efforts to demand access codes
to the E2EE embedded in the iPhone used by the deceased terrorist in that incident.28
For me, this issue raised the important question of whether the government has
the authority to, and ought to, require encryption designers and manufacturers to pre-
serve the means to enable government agents to lawfully access private data stored
on the devices they market. While many critics of such a proposal lamented the idea
of government mandated “backdoor” access to private data,29 I viewed this as a
requirement to build into the encryption an actual front door.30 In my view, backdoor
access connotes clandestine or surreptitious access.31 This, I argued, is exactly what
the government will be compelled to pursue and exploit when access through a pro-
verbial front door is impossible because there is no front door.32 However, by
creating a highly secure front door, it is possible to achieve a mutually satisfactory,
balanced alternative:
To be clear, this “split key” proposal is not a subterfuge method
of creating backdoor access to data. Unlike a backdoor, which
generally refers to an undisclosed vulnerability in an application
or device, a front door is a well-documented and clear mechanism
for both encrypting and decrypting data, whether it be data in
motion (communications) or at rest (stored data). To be secure,
27 The San Bernardino “incident” was a mass shooting that occurred on December 2, 2015,
at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. The U.S.-born married perpetrators,
Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, targeted a San Bernardino County Department of
Public Health training event and Christmas party. Richard Winton, A Year After the San Ber-
nardino Terror Attack, the FBI Is Still Struggling to Answer Key Questions, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1,
2016, 2:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-bernardino-terror-probe-20
161130-story.html [https://perma.cc/XC6C-GVX9]. For the purposes of this Article, the inci-
dent is notable for the FBI’s attempt to access encrypted data on Farook’s Apple iPhone, a move
that Apple refused to assist in, and that eventually led to federal court action between the Justice
Department and Apple. Matt Zapotosky, FBI Has Accessed San Bernardino Shooter’s Phone
Without Apple’s Help, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/fbi-has-accessed-san-bernardino-shooters-phone-without-apples-help
/2016/03/28/e593a0e2-f52b-11e5-9804-537defcc3cf6_story.html?utm_term=.cd0b9d1db91e
[https://perma.cc/UU9D-Y6JR]. Ultimately, the FBI did breach the device’s security software
and withdrew its lawsuit. Id.
28 See Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 22, at 337–38, 368–71.
29 See, e.g., Issue Brief: A “Backdoor” to Encryption for Government Surveillance, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to
-encryption-for-government-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/SD2T-B7HP].
30 See Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 22, at 361–62.
31 See id.
32 Id.
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encryption should be subject to rigorous testing. Thus, its pres-
ence should be open to the public and available for attack, both
in laboratories and in the real world. This is the only real way to
evaluate the trustworthiness of encryption, with vulnerabilities
being corrected as they are discovered, to strengthen the protocol
and its implementation constantly. Essentially, a front door is the
digital equivalent of a big, ingeniously engineered lock on the only
entrance to an otherwise secure building. It is a lock that has been
tested by every available lock picker and found to be secure, with
any identified weaknesses being constantly fixed. Such a lock is
always superior to a secret entrance in the rear of a building.33
Such front door access would better serve the interests of both privacy and security,
as each would be effectively balanced.34 First, by “splitting” the encryption key and
entrusting part of it to a neutral organization devoted to privacy protection, the indi-
vidual will be provided enhanced protection by imposing a greater burden on the
government to access the key.35 Second, by requiring compliance with normal Fourth
Amendment justifications and authorizations to engage in surveillance and seizure
of any data, the data will be protected with no less vigilance than the protection of
the home.36
Of course, creating a front door will inevitably facilitate government access to
private data when properly and lawfully authorized. This reality is contrary to the
objectives of many privacy advocates.37 Some even argue that such a creation is, in
effect, a subterfuge backdoor:
These opponents frame efforts to preserve such access as a call
for the creation of “backdoors” that can be exploited by the U.S.
and any other government. They argue that the creation of back-
doors will introduce unacceptable vulnerabilities in products and
systems and point to examples where, in the past, such vulnera-
bility have been exploited by hackers.38
33 Id. at 362.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 362–63.
36 Recent Australian legislation proposes a similar process whereby access can be legally
obtained via a warrant. See New Law Would Force Facebook and Google to Give Police
Access to Encrypted Messages, GUARDIAN (July 13, 2017, 23:14 EDT), https://www.the
guardian.com/technology/2017/jul/14/new-law-would-force-facebook-and-google-to-give
-police-access-to-encrypted-messages [https://perma.cc/KH7M-XLDK].
37 See, e.g., What Is Privacy, PRIVACY INT’L, https://www.privacyinternational.org/node
/54 [https://perma.cc/9E6W-CVDK] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
38 Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 22, at 361–62 (citations omitted).
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As I have argued previously, such a suggestion is shortsighted, as it is this approach
that actually further enables exploitation by hackers.39 When front door access is
eliminated from E2EE (or any other type of data storage), a determination that access
to that data is necessary and lawful will compel government agents to work to identify,
if not create, backdoor access.40 In such situations, there are strong incentives for that
access to be clandestine, because disclosing the access point will in turn alert the man-
ufacturer to a vulnerability requiring a security patch.41 It would be unwise for the
government to reveal the backdoor, only to then disclose it.42 As a result, an actual
privacy vulnerability, subject to exploitation by non-government actors, may persist.43
Furthermore, it is likely that the government may identify such “backdoor” vul-
nerabilities even when not engaged in surveillance efforts directed against specific
targets as part of overall data protection operations. Without confidence that data
access could be facilitated through lawful front door access, the government would
have a powerful incentive not to share this information with the manufacturer or
service providers. In short, front door access incentivizes government cooperation
with the private sector to identify and prevent backdoor breaches, which ultimately
enhances protection of private data from unlawful or unauthorized access.44
Reasonable people will inevitably differ on the proper balance between privacy
and public security implicated by encryption technology, as well as how encryption
facilitates exploitation of “dark spaces” by dangerous and nefarious actors. However,
it is legitimate that a balance between these interests should be the goal of law and
policy makers. Those who argue that no government effort to ensure lawful access
to these dark spaces can be tolerated without sacrificing essential liberty are comfort-
able with technological creation of impenetrable zones of privacy. While such zones
will obviously maximize the protection of privacy from government intrusion, they
will do so at a cost. As I argued in my prior chapter, I believe an impenetrable zone
of privacy is inconsistent with the underlying rationale of the Fourth Amendment:
Balancing the competing interests of collective societal security
and individual liberty is central to the Fourth Amendment touch-
stone of reasonableness. The notion that the Fourth Amendment
provides an individual right to an impenetrable zone of privacy
39 Geoffrey S. Corn, Averting the Inherent Dangers of “Going Dark”: Why Congress
Must Require a Locked Front Door to Encrypted Data, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1433, 1445
n.44 (2015).
40 See id. at 1447.
41 Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 22, at 361–62.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 The importance of ensuring cooperation between private and government actors should
not be understated. For an example of what may result were this cooperation absent, see Scott
Shane, Malware Case Is Major Blow for the N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/nsa-malware-case-shadow-brokers.html.
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is therefore inconsistent with the text and judicial interpretation
of the amendment. Instead, balance remains the operative concept:
protection against unreasonable search and seizure inherently
acknowledged that the people can be subjected to reasonable
searches and seizures. In short, the amendment never imposed
an absolute restraint on government surveillance, even when di-
rected against the interests protected by the amendment’s text
(persons, homes, papers, and effects). Instead, the people were
provided an absolute right to be secure against unreasonable
government intrusions into those places and things protected by
the Fourth Amendment.45
That key constitutional provision certainly does not mandate government action to
guard against the creation of such a zone, nor does it require the government to
tolerate such zones.46 Thus, from a regulatory perspective, the Fourth Amendment
is probably best understood as neutral on the question of whether government should
seek to mandate preservation of access to encrypted zones of privacy.47
But what the Fourth Amendment has historically tolerated—reasonable govern-
ment measures to investigate and discover crime and other threats to public security—
should be instructive in this debate.48 Reasonableness, after all, is as the Supreme
Court reminds us, the “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment.49 That touchstone of
reasonableness, in turn, is consistently defined by balancing individual privacy with
societal interests in effective law enforcement.50 With the exception of dangerous
medical procedures to recover evidence from within a suspect’s body,51 even the
most carefully protected zone of privacy—the home—is subject to government intru-
sion when properly authorized.52 If the most fundamental source of protection from
government intrusion into a citizen’s privacy is defined by a reasonable balance
between privacy and security, advancing this balance should be the ultimate objective
of lawmakers addressing the difficult question of how to deal with “dark spaces.”
Requiring preservation of encryption keys to facilitate lawful government access to
private data is, in my view, a rational manifestation of this balance of interests. In
45 Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 22, at 344.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1991).
49 Id. at 250.
50 E.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482–84 (2014) (tracing the Court’s con-
struction of “reasonableness” and tying it to the need to protect officer safety).
51 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) (holding that trying to remove a bullet from
suspect’s body was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
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contrast, allowing for the continued creation and enhancement of technology that
seeks to create impenetrable zones of privacy distorts this balance.
Ultimately, there are only three virtually undeniable constants in this debate.53
First, the market will continue to incentivize the development of encryption technol-
ogy that frustrates, and ideally prevents, government access to private communica-
tions.54 Second, while these innovations will be intended to preserve the privacy of
law abiding citizens, the dark spaces they create will offer exploitation opportunities
for individuals and groups engaged in activities that threaten society.55 And third,
the government will constantly endeavor to access these dark spaces, precisely because
of the risks inherent in allowing such exploitation.56 Furthermore, the nature of
national security threats, most notably terrorist threats targeting the U.S. homeland,
have magnified the government’s interest in penetrating these spaces.57
II. ASYMMETRY AND THE ADAPTIVE ENEMY
Concern over feasible access to encrypted communications is no longer simply
a question of balancing privacy against the interests of effective law enforcement.
Today, the risks attendant with “dark space” communications transcend criminal
threats and are inextricably intertwined with counterterrorism efforts.58 This should
come as no surprise. The United States is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict
against multiple transnational terrorist organizations.59 While the notion that re-
sponse to this threat qualifies as an armed conflict remains controversial for many
international law experts, the fact remains that the U.S. perceives the nature of the
threat posed by both al-Qaeda and ISIS as transcending that of ordinary criminal
activity.60 Instead, the national decision to treat the ongoing battle against these
threats as an armed conflict indicates a willingness to use expanded means and legal
authorities to disrupt and disable these groups.61
53 See Jaffer & Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 313–17.
54 See id. at 303, 313.
55 See id. at 315–17.
56 See id. at 296–98.
57 See Read the Full Testimony of FBI Director James Comey in Which He Discusses
Clinton Email Investigation, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/03/read-the-full-testimony-of-fbi-director-james-comey-in
-which-he-discusses-clinton-email-investigation/?utm_term=.0bdd2a85fee1 [https://perma
.cc/M2VR-P8BT].
58 See Stephanie Condon, Intelligence Officials Warn of Threats on “Dark” Internet,
CBS NEWS (June 3, 2015, 1:57 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/intelligence-officials
-warn-of-threats-on-dark-internet [https://perma.cc/RT8Q-EP3K].
59 See WATKIN, supra note 12, at 4–9.
60 See Vanda Felbab-Brown, Afghanistan’s Terrorism Resurgence: Al-Qaida, ISIS, and
Beyond, BROOKINGS (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghanistans
-terrorism-resurgence-al-qaida-isis-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/Q2BF-WT96].
61 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 6, 11 (2011)
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Of course, these enemies do not engage in and employ analogous debates or
handwritings over the appropriate legal framework for their terrorist activities. Instead,
they embrace tactics that constantly seek to exploit enemy vulnerabilities in order
to offset the superior material and information capabilities of their opponents—a
phenomenon characterized by the term, “asymmetric warfare.”62 Interestingly, there
is no consensus definition of asymmetric warfare.63 However, as the following sum-
mary indicates, it generally refers to conflict between conventionally disparate enemies,
with the inferior enemy seeking to offset its weakness by identifying and exploiting
vulnerabilities of the conventionally superior opponent:
Asymmetric warfare is generally understood to be a conflict in
which the strengths and sizes of the opponents do not mirror
each other. The side with the conventional disadvantage is prob-
ably incapable of winning through direct, conventional warfare.
It must seek victory through other methods that exploit weak-
nesses in the superior conventional power’s capacity to prevail.
Examples include the Maoist Peoples’ War against the Imperial
Japanese Army, the Vietnamese dau trahn strategy in the First
and Second Indochina Wars, and al-Qaeda’s tactics in the WOT
[(War on Terror)].64
So characterized, there is nothing new about asymmetric tactics, which have been
part of military theory and doctrine dating back to the writings of Sun Tzu.65 However,
the struggle against today’s transnational terrorist threats has resurrected the focus
on how to effectively address asymmetric threats, threats that challenge our national
security capabilities well beyond the “battlefield.”66 A Rand Report explains the
characteristics and challenges associated with this modern permutation of asymmet-
ric warfare:
[hereinafter 2011 TERRORISM STRATEGY]; David A. Wallace, Battling Terrorism Under the
Law of War, 87 MIL. REV. 101, 101–02 (2007).
62 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.130, ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE J-3 (2008) [hereinafter ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.130].
63 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 17 (2016) (defining “asymmetric,” but
failing to define “asymmetric warfare”).
64 ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.130, supra note 62, at J-3–J-4.
65 See SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR: COMPLETE TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES 88–89,
116–18 (Thomas Cleary trans., 2003) (discussing tactics against formless enemies and those
with superior advantages).
66 See generally AMICHAY AYALON & BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND CORP., WAR BY
WHAT MEANS, ACCORDING TO WHOSE RULES? THE CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACIES FACING
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS: PROCEEDINGS OF A RAND-ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE
WORKSHOP, DECEMBER 3–4, 2014, at 39–41 (2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_pro
ceedings/CF334.html [https://perma.cc/Y8VX-4WQ6].
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The legal dimension of asymmetric warfare is often called “law-
fare.” This is a relatively new area because the nature of modern
warfare has changed dramatically from that of the “classical”
wars of the past. In classical warfare, the enemy is visible, and
soldiers are easily identifiable by uniform and openly carry weap-
ons. The use of lawfare is part of the larger pursuit of legitimacy.
By contrast, in asymmetric warfare, the enemy is usually invisible,
hiding among the civilian population, often in densely populated
areas. Lethal attacks are often launched from civilian facilities.
There may be no means to distinguish combatants from the
civilian population.
In classical warfare, a democratic nation’s obligation and re-
sponsibility is to conduct the war according to the rules of war—
especially the principle of distinction between combatants and
civilians.
When it comes to asymmetric warfare, the opponent often targets
civilians, not only ignoring the rules of war but deliberately doing
so as part of an overall strategy against the democratic state.
In classical warfare, the ultimate goal of both sides is to defeat
the enemy with respect to its capabilities to use military power.
In asymmetric warfare, the opponent’s goal is not to defeat the
state’s armed forces but rather to make the civil society so terri-
fied and concerned that it will pressure politicians to withdraw
from the state’s positions or abandon its policy aims, thereby
losing the war not through the battlefield but through determina-
tion of the democracy not to continue fighting.
In classical warfare, the territorial and temporal limits of the
conflict are relatively defined. The nature of asymmetric warfare
is much more amorphous. It is not limited to a certain territory
or distinct timeline.
In classical warfare, the enemy’s fighters are essentially anony-
mous: It is not important to know the name of the enemy’s
soldier or commander before attacking him.
When it comes to asymmetric warfare, in many cases, it is cru-
cial to know the opponent and to have very personal and detailed
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information as a precondition for determining the legitimacy of
a strike.
These new features are different from the set of assumptions that
were the basis for the laws of war, especially international human-
itarian law. These laws are the basis of the legal norms, binding
democratic nations to conduct their military power accordingly.
This differentiation, combined with the emerging power and
influence of international tribunals, is known as lawfare.
Lawfare is often used as a negative term, suggesting manipula-
tion, although it is not limited to that. Ironically, it is an area in
which the democratic state and its officials feel vulnerable. In
contrast, the opponent often deliberately violates the norms
while simultaneously using them to weaken democratic nations.
Lawfare is used to counter the weapons of the democratic state
by exploiting its own laws and judicial systems. It focuses on
government and personal liability.
Because asymmetrical warfare takes place in densely populated
areas, it inevitably generates more grounds for legal action. While
nonstate adversaries typically do not comply with international
humanitarian law, as already noted, they will simultaneously use
that law to undermine the motivation and legitimacy of their
democratic state foes.
. . . .
There are inherent difficulties in applying the norms of interna-
tional humanitarian law to asymmetric warfare. Applying the
concept of proportionality is next to impossible and provides no
guidance to the commanders on the ground, since it comes with-
out clear guidelines. It is also difficult to apply the fundamental
principle of distinction in a civilian environment, since the entire
battlefield is often a civilian area, making it nearly impossible to
distinguish between combatants and civilians. Moreover, the
application of the principle of military necessity is problematic
when it relies heavily on intelligence and other secret evidence.
Finally, asymmetric warfare presents challenges to efficiently
striking the opponent without violating the principle of perfidy.
Effective warning—for example, roof knocking—weakens the
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chances of a successful military mission and places soldiers at
additional risk. Other challenges include striking political or
religious targets, regardless of whether they are also being used
to support active military operations. What about individuals
like Hamas leader Ismail Haniye? Or how should armies treat
bridges or electricity? In World War II, such targets were bombed
for obvious military reasons. In asymmetric warfare, they may
be considered civilian facilities.
Consequently, the challenge is how to adjust international hu-
manitarian law to apply to modern asymmetric wars. There needs
to be legal recognition of the constant state and timeless nature
of armed conflict against nonstate adversaries. There needs to be
legal application of the principle of self-defense against nonstate
adversaries when there is no other alternative (for example, in
failed states). Given that liberal democracies are often on the
front line in the fight against nonstate adversaries, there needs to
be a flow of information among them as well.
Furthermore, it is necessary to acknowledge the role that intelli-
gence plays in winning the war and to determine the “military
necessity” and the key element of intelligence for the principle
of distinction. Also, wider legal tools and wider public control
over intelligence agencies should be considered.
It is important to develop a publicly available code of conduct
for certain military actions, such as targeted killings. It is impor-
tant to know who is making the decisions and under what guide-
lines and circumstances targeted killings are allowed. Sharing
more intelligence publicly assists in efforts to win the imagefare
battle.67
As indicated in the RAND Report, one aspect of asymmetric terrorist tactics that
creates especially difficult challenges for law-abiding nations is exploitation of the
law to gain tactical advantage.68 Whether on a conventional battlefield in Iraq, an
unconventional battlefield like Afghanistan, or the enemy’s “homeland,” contempo-
rary enemies look for opportunities created by their opponent’s compliance with
legal obligations.69 This aspect of asymmetry may not be completely new, but it is
67 Id.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 40.
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more pervasive than ever before.70 This may be a consequence of the increasing role
law plays in defining the legitimacy of national security actions. In fact, the concept
of legitimacy is now included in some U.S. military doctrine as a principle of war,
alongside such time-tested principles as mass, offensive, and economy of force.71 As
a result, democracies face an increasingly difficult challenge of developing and
implementing national security policies that are effective, not only in the immediate
sense of achieving the effect on the opponent, but also in the sense that they mani-
fest the type of commitment to law that is central to the notion of legitimacy.
This aspect of asymmetry intersects directly with the issue of government
surveillance access to “dark spaces.” Remotely radicalized, homegrown terrorists
are assessed as among the most significant terrorist threats faced by Western nations.72
Furthermore, attacks in Paris, Brussels, and other major cities demonstrate the risk
of small, well-organized attack cells operating in relative plain sight.73 Whether it
is a lone wolf, or a small cell of organized operatives, communication is obviously
essential for their success. And, because it is no mystery that the government is
constantly seeking to identify and preempt terrorist attacks, it must be self-evident
to such individuals that identification and exploitation of dark communication zones
will substantially enhance their likelihood of success. Investigations into several
attacks, such as the ISIS Paris bombings and the Brussels airport bombing, indicate
that operatives relied on WhatsApp for vital communications.74
The ready availability of E2EE with no built in front door access will almost
certainly be viewed by those engaged in terroristic activities as the communications
method of choice. Like all aspects of asymmetric warfare, they will seek to exploit
what is viewed as a self-inflicted vulnerability to the maximum extent. The more
confident they are in the immunity of their communications from timely government
surveillance, the more likely it is they will rely on such dark spaces. But this also means
that the government is all that more likely to increase efforts to penetrate such spaces.
And this really frames the ultimate question in the encryption debate: does increasing
70 See id. at 41–44.
71 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 9, at I-2 (“Since the establishment of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1947, joint doctrine has recognized the nine principles of war. Subsequent
experience from a wide variety of irregular warfare (IW) situations has identified three ad-
ditional principles—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.”).
72 See generally Toni Johnson, Threat of Homegrown Islamist Terrorism, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/threat-homegrown-islamist-terrorism [https://
perma.cc/L67S-W9ZG] (last updated Sept. 30, 2011).
73 See Zainab Fattah & Ladane Nasseri, Here Are the Major Terror Attacks in Europe,
From Paris to Oslo, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2017-06-19/here-are-the-major-terror-attacks-in-europe-from-paris-to-oslo
[https://perma.cc/2D6T-SJR2].
74 Sebastian Rotella, ISIS via WhatsApp: ‘Blow Yourself Up, O Lion,’ FRONTLINE
(July 11, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/isis-via-whatsapp-blow-yourself
-up-o-lion/ [https://perma.cc/SD38-6NBP].
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the difficulty of lawful government access ultimately advance or compromise legiti-
mate privacy interests? The answer to this question may be derived in part from the
multipronged legal framework the U.S. relies on for counterterrorism operations.75
III. COUNTERTERRORISM: “FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARY”
In his award-winning book, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries, Brigadier General
(Retired) Kenneth Watkin, the former Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Armed
Forces, explores the many legal uncertainties associated with military operations
against non-state threats.76 Central to his thesis is that the nature of the threats posed
by these groups straddles the line between criminal law enforcement and military
armed conflict77:
A particular challenge for international law is how to deal with
conflicts that are fundamentally “criminal insurgencies.” In some
instances these insurgencies are conducted by gangs for which
“[d]rug trafficking organization is no longer a sufficient term
for them; they are a criminal paramilitary complex.” There often
is little difference in terms of organization between such para-
military gangs and insurgent groups. Taken together, these new
threats have been described as “nonstate” (e.g., gangs, insurgents,
drug traffickers, transnational criminal organizations, terrorists,
warlords), where conflict “thrive[s] in ‘ungoverned or weakly
governed space’ between or within various host countries,” and
intrastate, “which tends to involve direct and indirect conflict
between state and nonstate actors.” Such conflicts challenge not
only traditional notions of what constitutes armed conflict but
also how amendable the resulting violence is to a law enforce-
ment response. As a result, “[t]he power to deal with these kinds
of situations is no longer hard combat firepower or even the
more benign police power.” These situations of insecurity chal-
lenge traditional notions of the dividing line between armed
conflict and ordinary law enforcement.78
75 See generally THE LAW OF COUNTERTERRORISM (Lynne K. Zusman ed., 2011) (provid-
ing a number of perspectives on what “counterterorism” means and the role that the law plays
in the United States’ effort to combat transnational terrorism).
76 See WATKIN, supra note 12, at 5–6, 10, 16, 23. Watkin’s comprehensive work was the
winner of the 2017 Francis Lieber Prize. See OXFORD U. PRESS, https://global.oup.com/aca
demic/product/fighting-at-the-legal-boundaries-9780190457976?cc=us&lang=en& [https://
perma.cc/7W4N-FQLF] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
77 See WATKIN, supra note 12, at 6.
78 Id. at 6–7 (citations omitted).
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For Watkin, this requires a careful and deliberate strategic and operational assess-
ment of if and when resort to authorities restricted to armed conflict may be legiti-
mately invoked.79
The United States has been fighting at this “legal boundary” since it initiated the
military response to the September 11 terrorist attacks (and according to government
prosecutors at Guantanamo, even before that date).80 Characterizing this response,
or at least aspects of this response, as an armed conflict is a position that has been
embraced by all three branches of the federal government.81 This characterization
was of profound significance. By doing so, the United States invoked a range of
counterterrorism response authorities that would otherwise not have been available
pursuant to a peacetime law enforcement characterization.82
Attacking individuals with lethal force and indefinite preventive detention are
probably the most notable (and, in the view of some notorious) manifestations of
this expansion of authority.83 These two aspects of U.S. counterterrorism policy are
not directly related to the issue of “dark space” surveillance. However, the broader
significance of these policies is that they reflect a reality that transcends these specific
measures, the reality that Brigadier General Watkin highlights in his book: threats
that straddle the legal boundary between law enforcement and “war” may incentivize
expansive invocations of international law derived war powers by States struggling
to disrupt or disable these threats.84
The invocation of war powers to respond to the 9/11 terrorist attacks did impact
the government’s legal theory related to surveillance.85 In fact, one of the most
79 See id. at 329–31.
80 See Morris Davis, Op-Ed, Here’s Why I Resigned as the Chief Prosecutor at Guan-
tanamo, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe
-davis-why-i-resigned-as-chief-prosecutor-for-military-commissions-guantanamo-20171004
-story.html [https://perma.cc/6FQV-BM4C]; see also Kyndra Rotunda, Applying Geneva
Convention Principles to Guantánamo Bay, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1067 (2009).
81 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(congressional declaration of armed conflict); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630
(2006) (judiciary treating issue as armed conflict); 2011 TERRORISM STRATEGY, supra note
61, at 3 (executive branch addressing terrorist threat as armed conflict).
82 Philip M. Bridwell & Jamil N. Jaffer, Updating the Counterterrorism Toolkit: A Brief
Sampling of Post-9/11 Surveillance Laws and Authorities, in THE LAW OF COUNTERTER-
RORISM 231, 237–38 (Lynne K. Zusman ed., 2011).
83 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Opinion, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion of a President’s
Power to Make War, TIME (Sept. 11, 2014), http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers
-bush/ [https://perma.cc/P4AR-9MDV]; Brendan Fischer & Lisa Graves, International Law
and the War on Terror, WATSON INST. FOR INT’L & PUB. AFF. (2011), http://watson.brown
.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2011/International%20Law%20and%20the%20War
%20on%20Terror.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SVD-XAU9].
84 See WATKIN, supra note 12, at 22–23.
85 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S INVOLVE-
MENT WITH THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (U) 1–2 (2009) [hereinafter PSP
REPORT]; see also Bridwell & Jaffer, supra note 82, at 231.
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controversial policies adopted by the Bush administration was the Presidential
Surveillance Program (PSP), referred to as “Stellar Wind” in its classified form.86
This program involved large-scale communications surveillance that included within
its scope telephone calls with one party in the United States, potentially involving
U.S. persons, based solely on repeated, short-duration Executive Branch authoriza-
tions.87 The fact that the government engaged in such surveillance was not necessar-
ily controversial. What was controversial was the decision to implement the program
outside of the existing framework for review and authorization for such surveillance
activities established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).88 FISA,
enacted by Congress in 1978, requires judicial authorization for foreign intelligence
surveillance activities, which include surveillance directed against international
terrorist organizations.89
As justification for implementing the program outside of the FISA framework,
the President and his legal advisors asserted multiple authorities over the course of
PSP’s existence.90 The most notable of these was the constitutionally vested author-
ity as Commander in Chief of the armed forces:
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which was one of the
primary authorities cited in the Presidential Authorizations in
support of the legality of the Stellar Wind program, provides in
relevant part:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the
86 See PSP REPORT, supra note 85, at 28, 406–07. See generally Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012). The program was and is now referred
to by numerous names, as set forth in the Justice Department’s assessment in the PSP Report:
The President and other Administration officials labeled the NSA
collection of information that was publicly disclosed as “the Terrorist
Surveillance Program,” although this name was sometimes used within
the Intelligence Community to refer to the entire Stellar Wind program.
The program was also referred to by other names, such as the “Warrant-
less Wiretapping Program” or the “NSA Surveillance Program.” As
discussed above, the technical name for the program, and the term we
generally use throughout this report, is the Stellar Wind program.
PSP REPORT, supra note 85, at 3.
87 See PSP REPORT, supra note 85, at 14 n.16, 16, 28 (stating that between October 4,
2001, and February 1, 2007, forty-three of these authorizations were issued).
88 See CORN ET AL., supra note 18, at 198 (discussing how FISA differed from existing
Title III framework for warrants).
89 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813; CORN ET AL., supra note 18, at 196–258 (providing a de-
tailed discussion of intelligence exploitation).
90 See PSP REPORT, supra note 85, at 7–18.
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United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices . . . .91
Because the nation was engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, gathering
of intelligence against this “enemy” threat was, according to the President, a tradi-
tional war power requiring no statutory authorization.92
Public and congressional reaction to this program led to its termination, and
subsequent surveillance efforts were conducted pursuant to FISA (which was amended
several times to better accommodate counterterrorism concerns).93 However, the
assertion of a war powers-based justification for dispensing with FISA surveillance
authorization requirements indicates the impact of designating counterterrorism
efforts as an armed conflict. While it may be true that to date, FISA is considered
sufficient to accommodate government intelligence collection and counterterrorism
surveillance interests,94 there is no guarantee that this will always be the case.
Ultimately, the intersection between counterterrorism, armed conflict, and
government surveillance interests cannot be ignored when considering how to best
address the risks associated with “dark spaces.” So long as assertion of war powers
to justify intelligence gathering and counterterrorism efforts remains a possibility,
the development of technology that facilitates such spaces may not offer the benefits
that many privacy advocates hope for. Perhaps carefully regulated access to such
spaces will ultimately advance privacy interests by incentivizing government action
on the “peacetime” territory of this complex legal boundary.
IV. BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR
If, as most anticipate, encryption development will continue to increase access
to “dark spaces,” the government will be confronted with a limited range of response
91 Id. at 7 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2); see Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Status of Certain OLC Opin-
ions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/03/09/memostatusolcopinions0115
2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9TR-3MB4] (discussing the President’s Article II authority with
respect to FISA).
92 See PSP REPORT, supra note 85, at 7–16 (containing, among other things, a timeline of
the legal authorities on which the government relied at certain phases in the PSP’s existence).
93 See CORN ET AL., supra note 18, at 202, 204, 245.
94 See generally James G. McAdams, III, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA):
An Overview, FED. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., http://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files
/imported_files/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by
-subject/miscellaneous/ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC6B-46RE]
(last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (stating how Congress has enhanced the ability of counterterrorism
agents to use FISA).
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options. One option would be to simply let the market drive the technological advances
in encryption, with the accordant risk of increasingly impenetrable E2EE. Another
option would be to prohibit “keyless” E2EE altogether. A third option would be to
seek a reasonable accommodation of the societal interest in enhanced protection for
private data and the government interest in effective law enforcement and national
security surveillance.
Advocates of the first option may believe that it provides the best protection
against privacy compromise, either the result of unlawful government action or private
intrusions. However, these advocates may not have fully contemplated the risk that
foreclosing government access to data through normal, law enforcement-type modali-
ties may push the government into pursuing extraordinary surveillance measures
justified by an assertion of war powers. There is no reason to expect that the govern-
ment will ignore the potential security advantages of surveillance targeted at “dark
spaces.”95 Indeed, the nature of the international terrorist threats confronting the
nation—threats emanating from organizations that rely heavily on commercial com-
munications capabilities not only for command and control, but for recruiting and
inciting violent terrorist actions—virtually guarantees that government counterterrorism
efforts will constantly seek to access such data.
Without an ability to rely on normal law enforcement agencies and processes
to engage in such surveillance, the government will not simply “give up” the effort.
Instead, the incentive to invoke wartime powers and utilize all surveillance capabili-
ties, including military capability, will be increased. Like the Bush-era PSP, a future
President would need only determine that the information sought by the government
was related to an enemy involved in an ongoing armed conflict with the United States.
And this might not be an all that difficult finding to make. First, as has been demon-
strated with the seemingly endless expansion of authority derived from the post-9/11
Authorization for Use of Military Force,96 it has not been terribly difficult to link
terrorist organizations to that authority.97 Second, even a presidential determination
that a terrorist threat fell beyond the scope of that authorization would not bar a Presi-
dent from invoking war powers as a justification for surveillance efforts.98 Because
it is now well established that international terrorist organizations may present the
United States with a threat of an “armed attack,” a President would be able to invoke
the inherent constitutional “defensive” war power to disrupt or disable such a threat.
Of course, any president moving down this road would have to contend with the
same obstacle that confronted President Bush—that even when dealing with wartime
95 See Condon, supra note 58.
96 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
97 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2101–17 (2005).
98 See Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless
NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.  J. 147, 179–84 (2006).
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threats, FISA establishes the sole means for authorizing surveillance.99 But, this is
not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle. First, President Bush never conceded
a lack of constitutional authority for his program, but simply chose to acquiesce to
the use of FISA as the means to obtain surveillance authorization.100 Second, FISA
may very well provide ample authority to utilize extraordinary measures to penetrate
“dark spaces” to include the use of military surveillance capabilities.
So where does this leave us? In a nutshell, the proverbial unstoppable force seems
to be colliding with the immovable object—encryption will continue to improve the
“darkness” of “dark spaces,” and the government’s interest in accessing those spaces
will only continue to increase. Ignoring these realities carries great peril, because it
will almost certainly push the government towards more extreme measures to achieve
its vital counterterrorism intelligence objectives.
The third option averts this risk and also averts the risk of granting nefarious
actors a windfall of operational maneuver space. This option involves a statutory
mandate that encryption build in front-door access. Congress could impose this
mandate on any entity marketing encryption technology in the United States. As
noted above, there is no reason to believe that such a legislative mandate would
conflict with Fourth Amendment protections.101 Instead, such a mandate can be seen
as aligned with the Fourth Amendment, because it will incentivize the use of “nor-
mal” surveillance authorization methods to achieve counterterrorism and law
enforcement objectives.102
Opponents to this third, middle-ground approach and proposed Congressional man-
date “argue that the creation of back doors will introduce unacceptable vulnerabilities
in products and systems and point to examples where, in the past, such vulnerabilities
99 See id. at 160–64.
100 PSP REPORT, supra note 85, at 250–51, 260. The following excerpt from the Justice De-
partment’s contribution to the PSP Report sheds light on the open-ended conclusion to the PSP:
On December 8, 2006, the President signed what would become the
final Presidential Authorization for the Stellar Wind program. The
December 8 Authorization was scheduled to expire on February 1, 2007.
However, Judge Howard’s January 10, 2007, Orders relating to foreign
and domestic selectors completed the transition of Stellar Wind’s
communications and meta data collection activities from Presidential
Authorization to FISA authority. Bradbury told the OIG that because
it was believed that Judge Howard’s Orders, particularly the foreign
selectors Order, provided the NSA sufficient flexibility to conduct
content collection, it was not necessary to renew the December 8, 2006,
Presidential Authorization.
Therefore, on February 1, 2007, the Presidential Authorization for the
Stellar Wind program officially expired.
Id. at 250–51.
101 See supra Part I.
102 See supra Part I.
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have been exploited by hackers.”103 This concern is legitimate; however, as noted
above, such a concern is not sufficient to necessitate allowing unrestricted encryption
development.104 First, measures could be adopted to mitigate the risk of government
abuse of surveillance power, such as a split-key concept outlined earlier that provides
a prophylactic protection against improper government access to encrypted data.
Second, the ready availability to lawful access will obviously incentivize gov-
ernment reliance on judicial authorization, thereby enhancing protection against
improper government access. Finally, even if it is assumed that no measure can
guarantee protection against unlawful government surveillance, that risk is no
different than any other type of government surveillance. After all, nothing prevents
government agents from unlawfully entering and searching a home. Nonetheless,
homes have doors that facilitate access. It is therefore odd to assert that protection
against unlawful government access to data necessitates a “doorless” container,
whereas the home itself includes an analogous inherent risk.
Ultimately, facilitating lawful and judicially authorized government access to
encrypted data will enhance and not degrade privacy protection. It will incentivize
government/private information sharing on security breaches; it will subject the
government to the process of surveillance authorization that exemplifies “reason-
ableness” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment;105 and it will disincentivize pursuit of
extraordinary extrajudicial methods to access such data. In an era of virtually endless
armed conflict against transnational terrorist organizations,106 this latter consideration
deserves more attention. Like the debate over expanding the public safety exception
for terrorist questioning without a Miranda warning,107 it is essential to recognize that
the “military track” profoundly impacts the cost/benefit analysis. When the cost of
policy decisions is not necessarily an increase in individual liberty, but a shift of
government authority to a wartime military track, it should cause significant pause.
CONCLUSION
As I have indicated throughout both this Article and in my earlier chapter, there
are numerous advantages to a lawful “front door” access point to encrypted informa-
tion. First, such an access method is the appropriate approach for striking a balance
with the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. Secondly, the nature and
frequency of now constantly emerging asymmetric threats necessitates adopting an
approach that denies these perpetrators the forum in which to enjoy completely
103 Corn, supra note 39, at 1445–46 (citations omitted).
104 See supra Part I.
105 See supra Part I.
106 See WATKIN, supra note 12, at 4–9.
107 See generally Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Strange Bedfellows: How Expanding the
Public Safety Exception to Miranda Benefits Counterrorism Suspects, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1 (2013).
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secret communication. But my primary point of this Article is to iterate an additional
consideration—that the increasingly tenuous line between wartime and peacetime
government power has created an atmosphere where any excessive restrictions of law
enforcement response authority risks an expansion of the wartime response author-
ity. Therefore, for individual liberty to be protected, law enforcement counterterrorism
response authority must be maximized.
